Security of RFID systems is a very important issue with the increasing of their applications. To achieve secure communications between a reader and a tag in RFID systems, encryption of the communication data is usually performed. However, in case of low-cost RFID tags, it is difficult for them to adopt the well-known encryption algorithms because the tags have very limited resources to implement the encryption algorithms. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new lightweight authenticated symmetric key encryption algorithm for RFID systems which use low-cost tags. To achieve a secure message authentication in the proposed algorithm, redundant bits are contained in a ciphertext. Even though the proposed algorithm uses very lightweight operations for the encryption/decryption, it provides confidentiality, authentication, and integrity.
lightweight authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags was proposed. Actually in LARAR, to enhance security, we modified the original merge and separation operations defined in [11] . Even though LAEAR provides authentication, it does not use NFSR and LFSR in the tags unlike in RBS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe RBS as related research. Then, we present a new authenticated encryption algorithm, LAEAR for the low-cost RFID tags in Section 3. In section 4, we discuss the security analysis and performance evaluation of LAEAR. In section 5, the conclusion is given.
Related Research
As a related research of this paper, we briefly introduce redundant bit security (RBS) algorithm [10] in this section. RBS is a lightweight authenticated encryption algorithm which was designed for RFID systems using resource constrained devices such as low-cost RFID tags. In the algorithm, a ciphertext is made by merging redundant bits and bits of a plaintext. RBS is composed of three parts: MAC generator, encryption part, and decryption part. Each part is described below briefly.
MAC Generator
The MAC algorithm is composed of three parts: a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), a non-linear feedback shift register (NFSR), and an accumulator as in Fig.  1 . The s(x) is the result of performing bitwise addition of LFSR with the result of NFSR function which feeds back into the NFSR. The accumulator register bits are XOR-ed by NFSR's value if mi is equal to "1", where the mi is the input message. LFSR and NFSR registers are initialized to the secret key and the accumulator register is initialized to "0". Then, the message enters bit by bit at each clock cycle. When all bits of input message are checked, the accumulator will have the MAC of the message [10] . In order to generate a different MAC, the value of the NFSR and LFSR must be unique per each message. Therefore, bitwise addition on plaintext and the encryption key value is performed for each plaintext. 
Encryption Part
The encryption process will be done as follows. At first, the plaintext is altered by bitwise addition between itself and the MAC (redundant bits). Then, the altered plaintext is merged with redundant bits according to each bit of the encryption key during data transmission. If the i th bit of the secret key is "0", then one bit in the altered plaintext is transmitted as the i th bit of the ciphertext. Otherwise, one bit in the redundant bits is transmitted as the i th bit of the ciphertext.
Decryption Part
The decryption process is composed of the inverse processing of the encryption process and a message authentication processing. At the first step, the altered plaintext and the redundant bits are extracted from the received ciphertext according to each bit of the encryption key. Then, the original plaintext will be recovered by performing bitwise addition over the redundant bits and the altered plaintext. Finally, message authentication process will be done by generating of the MAC using the recovered plaintext and the secret key. If the generated MAC is different from the received redundant bits, the authentication has failed and the recovered plaintext message is discarded.
Proposed LAEAR Algorithm
In this section, we propose a very lightweight authenticated encryption algorithm for low-cost RFID tags (LARAR). As mentioned before, LAEAR uses two main operations, merge and separation operations, which are modified from the original definition in [11] . These two original operations perform merging bits from two bit-strings and separating the bits into two bit-strings. However, the modified merge and separation operations manipulate three bit-strings. Unlike in [11] , in the modified operations proposed in this paper, the relative order of merged bits is changed in the ciphertext, which provides enhancement of security. The definition of the modified merge and separation operations is listed below.
Definition. Suppose A, B, C, D, and K are bit-strings whose lengths are in multiples of l-bits, and their specific bit-strings are as follows.
where total count of 0 = total count of 1=l D= 1 2 ⋯ 3 Then the merge operation, Mer(A,B,C,K,D) is as follows: is "1" and 2 − is "0", then the indexed bit of D is moved to . If is "1" and 2 − is "1", then the indexed bit of D is moved to − . Since each length of A, B, and C is l bits, the length of D is 3l bits. The parameter K in the operations is a secret key where the total bits of "0" and "1" are equal as l. We show an example in Fig. 2 that illustrates the movement of bits when ( , , , ) and ( , , , ) operations are performed.
Fig. 2 Execution Example of Mer() and Sep()
In the proposed LARAR, the reader and tag will share a secret key denoted by K which has same number of "0" and "1". When the K is stored in the reader and the tag, it will be split and stored as 1 and 2 where 1 is the left half part of K and 2 is the right half part of K.
LARAR uses a random number generated by the reader for each communication message. By using the random number, even if the same plaintext is encrypted many times, the ciphertexts will be different from one another. It will contribute to enhance the security of the encryption algorithm. While the reader generates a random number to encrypt a plaintext, the tag never generates any random numbers but uses the random number generated by the reader in the processing of encryption. Since the proposed algorithm is designed for low-cost passive tags and communications will be always initiated by the reader, there is no problem to reuse the random number at tag side. Therefore, in the tag side, LARAR does not use heavy operations but uses very light operations: XOR, Mer(), and Sep() operations. In LARAR, the encryption and decryption processes of the reader are different from those of the tag. We describe the encryption/decryption algorithms of LAEAR below and summarize in Fig. 3. 
Encryption Algorithm in the Reader
The reader generates a random number, n and computes = ⊕ ⊕ 1 and = ⊕ 2 where is a plaintext. Then, it performs the merge operation, ( , , , 1 ∥ 2 , 1 ∥ 2 ∥ 3 ) and sends the ciphertext, ( 1 ∥ 2 ∥ 3 ) to the tag. Each bit of the ciphertext can be sent bit by bit as soon as each bit is merged.
Decryption Algorithm in the Tag
After receiving the ciphertext, ( 1 ∥ 2 ∥ 3 ), the tag performs the separation operation,
( 
Encryption Algorithm in the Tag
The tag computes = ⊕ ′ ⊕ 2 and = ⊕ 1 where is a plaintext and ′ is the extracted random number from the last message received from the reader. Then, it performs the merge operation, ( , , ′ , 2 ∥ 1 , 4 ∥ 5 ∥ 6 ) and sends the ciphertext, ( 4 ∥ 5 ∥ 6 ) to the reader. Of course, each bit of the ciphertext, ( 4 ∥ 5 ∥ 6 ) can be sent bit by bit as soon as each bit is merged.
Decryption Algorithm in the Reader
After receiving the ciphertext, ( 4 ∥ 5 ∥ 6 ), the reader performs the separation operation, 
Security Analysis and Performance Evaluation

Security Analysis
The security strength of a cipher depends on the resistance strength against security attacks breaking the cipher. The key space of a cipher is a well-known parameter to measure the security strength of the cipher. In LAEAR, the key If the length of a plaintext is l bits, then the key length will be 2l bits where the total count of "0" is equal to that of "1". Assume l is 64 bits, then the key space will be ( 128 64 ) which is approximately 2 124 . We can say that if the key space of a cipher is 2 124 , the cipher is computationally secure from the brute force attack. Therefore, LAEAR is safe from the brute force attack if each partial key length of the tag is greater or equal to 64.
In LAEAR, the bits of a random number are diffused to a ciphertext for each encryption. Therefore, even if the same plaintext is encrypted several times, the ciphertexts are completely different from one another. Since the random number cannot be extracted from the communication messages by the attackers, LAEAR is safe from the known plaintext attacks or chosen plaintext attacks.
Assume a ciphertext is modified by an attacker during communications. The modified ciphertext cannot pass the verification to authenticate the plaintext. Since a random number diffused to the ciphertext, ( 1 ∥ 2 ∥ 3 ) , some modification of it will fail to pass the verification. Hence, LAEAR provides authentication and integrity of a plaintext.
Therefore, even if LAEAR uses extremely lightweight operations, it is safe from the well-known security attacks.
Performance Evaluation
Performance of the proposed protocol, LARAR is compared to RBS [10] in Table 2 . Since the reader is powerful enough to generate random numbers, evaluation of LAEAR is performed only for the tag side. We summarized the comparison results in Table 2 where L denotes the block length of a plaintext.
As we can see in Table 2 , the secret key length of the two algorithms is same. However, since LAEAR changes the relative bit's order of a plaintext in the corresponding ciphertext, we can say that LARAR is more secure than RBS. In addition, LAEAR uses extremely lightweight operations: XOR, Mer(), and Sep() operations. However, RBS uses a MAC generator which requires relatively a considerable amount of resources and execution time in case of the low-cost tags. Therefore, we can say that LAEAR has a better performance than RBS in terms of both required resources to implement the cipher and computation costs to perform the cipher. However, in LAEAR, the length of the ciphertext is longer than that of RBS. In spite of the disadvantage, LAEAR will be a good solution for the low-cost passive RFID tags which have significantly constrained resources. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new lightweight authenticated symmetric key encryption algorithm, LAEAR for the RFID systems which use low-cost tags. Even though LAEAR uses very lightweight operations, the merge and separation operations, it provides confidentiality, authentication, and integrity. Through the security analysis and performance evaluation, we showed that LAEAR is secure and efficient enough to be implemented and executed in the low-cost RFID tags.
